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Abstract
I explore the hypothesis that Hurricane Katrina in 2005 raised perceived back-
ground risks, which had spillover effects on behavioral health outcomes of mental
health, substance use, and health insurance. I explore this hypothesis using Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System data for 2002-2007. I use a difference-in-difference
model to estimate the effect that Hurricane Katrina had in the non-damaged storm
surge region, in 90-day intervals leading up to and after the hurricane, compared
to areas impervious to hurricanes. Within non-damaged counties at risk of any
storm surge, I find causal evidence that Katrina increased poor mental health days
by 8.8% for three months after Katrina, and increased smoking by 10% over nine
months, which translates to 39.0 million extra days of poor mental health and 1.1
million extra smokers. Results suggest that perceived background risk increases may
have important spillover effects on health for people far from the actual disaster,
and highlight a hidden cost of the government’s failures in managing Hurricane Katrina.
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I Introduction
Due to its uniqueness, Hurricane Katrina (hereafter referred to as “Katrina”) likely in-
creased perceived background risk for individuals residing in areas with actual risk to future
hurricanes, even if these individuals did not directly experience destruction from Katrina.
24/7 media coverage of the disaster may have reminded individuals that hurricanes can be
deadly, levies can fail, and the government, including the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), may not provide protection. If perceived background risks change, this
could have spillover effects in a variety of areas, including health. In this study, I explore
possible spillover effects of an increase in perceived background risk on behavioral health
outcomes of mental health, substance use, and health insurance coverage.
Katrina was a unique hurricane in terms of severity and media coverage. It was the
deadliest natural disaster in the United States in nearly a century, causing 1,836 deaths in
total. The city of New Orleans in Louisiana was struck on August 29, 2005, and the damage
extended to states of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. 24/7 news coverage transferred
images of Katrina-induced death and destruction to households across the United States. A
few examples of this ubiquitous news coverage are that the Los Angeles Times had a Katrina
front-page headline and lead image for 15 days straight, and the New York Times had a
Katrina front-page headline for 13 out of 15 days (Kimball et al. 2006). In polling conducted
a week following Katrina, 93% of Americans believed Katrina to be the worst natural disaster
in their lifetime (Gallup News Service 2005a). The public was mostly unhappy with the
government’s response, with various aspects of government receiving approval ratings of
between 36-42% for their response (Gallup News Service 2005b). Much blame was laid at
the feet of FEMA, whose director resigned two weeks following the disaster.
To explore possible spillover effects of perceived background risk changes, I use individual-
level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System from 2002-2007 for 1,299,101
adults (≥ 18 years of age) residing in the continental United States. I exploit the fact
that individuals reside in counties with different actual hurricane risks using county-level
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meteorological and geographical data. After excluding counties directly damaged by Katrina
(and other hurricanes shortly after Katrina), I use a difference-in-difference (DD) analysis
to compare post-Katrina outcome measures for individuals residing in counties differentially
at-risk to future hurricanes with individuals residing in counties largely impervious to future
hurricanes.
A key challenge for my identification strategy is potential confounding from migration
and economic factors. Katrina may have disproportionately disrupted the economies of
coastal communities not directly damaged by Katrina, compared to economies further inland.
Additionally, evacuees from Katrina settled disproportionately in coastal counties, especially
Houston, Texas (McIntosh 2008; Hussey, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Pacurar 2011). Katrina
evacuees may be different from non-Katrina evacuees in both observable and unobservable
ways. While I can control for observable population differences brought about by Katrina
evacuees moving disproportionately into the control and treatment groups, unobservable
population differences could introduce bias into the analysis.
I mitigate possible confounding from unobserved differences in migration and economic
climate after Katrina in several ways. First, I exclude counties that were directly damaged
by Katrina, or that were damaged by two other hurricanes making landfall shortly after
Katrina. These counties are likely to have been most significantly affected by migration
and economic factors. My treatment group is therefore areas that are vulnerable to hurri-
canes but were not directly damaged by these hurricanes. In the analysis, I then control for
individual-level observable characteristics associated with migration and economic factors,
such as race/ethnicity, employment status, and household income. To get a sense of the
magnitude in which unobserved factors may enter into the analysis, I check the balance of
the data before and after Katrina based on key demographic characteristics. I do not ob-
serve substantial variation in observables before and after Katrina, suggesting unobserved
differences are also likely small. To proxy control for any remaining unobservable differences
in migration or economic climate, I control at the county level for number of evacuees per
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capita and distance to New Orleans in the post period, and at the state level for unemploy-
ment rates. In these ways, I can isolate the effect of perceived background risk changes on
behavioral health outcomes.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The first strand explores the effects
of background risk on risk aversion and decision-making in the presence of risk. New risk
information, such as from an information campaign on radon exposure, has been found to
raise perceived background risk (Smith and Johnson 1988). One study directly measured
an increase in risk aversion in Germany, in particular closer to nuclear reactors, due to a
nuclear disaster in Japan (Goebel et al. 2015). Other studies have explored how background
risk influences decisions involving financial risk, finding decreased stock market participa-
tion (Heaton and Lucas 2000), increased insurance demand (Gollier and Pratt 1996), and
decreased risk-taking in experimental games (Cameron and Shah 2013).
Related, several studies use home sales data and DD methodologies to estimate the im-
pact of hurricanes as sources of new risk information on property prices. Following Hurricane
Andrew that struck Florida in 1992 and controlling for damage and changes in insurance,
property values were found to decline in Dade County, which was directly impacted. Prop-
erty values also decreased in Lee County, a near-miss county, by less than in Dade County
(Carbone, Hallstrom, and Smith 2006; Hallstrom and Smith 2005). These results suggest
that households notice disasters, even “near miss” disasters, and update perceived back-
ground risk in response to this new information. Market responses follow. These responses
appear to be temporary rather than permanent: property value differentials disappeared
after five years (Bin and Landry 2013).
The second strand of literature relevant to my research relates to the mental and physical
health of individuals directly impacted by large-scale disasters. Using longitudinal data,
Smith found that longevity expectations declined for older adults in Dade County due to a
direct hit from Hurricane Andrew (Smith 2008). Currie and Rossin-Slater used vital records
data to explore the impact of exposure to hurricanes during pregnancy on the probability of
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stress-related abnormal birth conditions. Stress was found to be a residual explanation on
some abnormal birth outcomes after accounting for migration, changes in medical care, and
changes in maternal behavior (Currie and Rossin-Slater 2013).
This paper attempts to explore the spillover effects of an exogenous increase in perceived
background risk from Katrina on mental health, substance use, and health insurance. The
paper exploits Katrina as a unique natural disaster with destructive force not seen in gener-
ations. I find causal evidence that mental health declined in storm surge counties relative to
control counties for a period of about 3 months, and smoking increased for a period of about
9 months. I find little evidence that binge drinking or health insurance coverage increased
due to Katrina.
II Conceptual Model
In a world of perfect information, individuals correctly estimate the probability of a
disaster and FEMA’s ability to respond. In this state of the world, perceived background
risk would not change with a large-scale disaster because the probability of this disaster
would have been perfectly anticipated. However, Katrina may have been a source of new
information about actual risks in a world of incomplete information, which would increase the
level of perceived background risk. This perceived background risk may affect individual’s
health directly, or indirectly through changes in property values, flood insurance premiums,
or longevity expectations, for example.
Perceived background risk changes may diminish mental health because people feel more
vulnerable. Perceived background risk could also be linked with decreased longevity expec-
tations or housing values, which in turn could reduce mental health (Carbone, Hallstrom,
and Smith 2006; Hallstrom and Smith 2005; Bin and Landry 2013; Smith 2008).
Perceived background risk could also affect substance use for a variety of reasons. In-
dividuals may attempt to self-medicate poor mental health from perceived background risk
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increases by using substances (Pesko and Baum 2016). Increases in financial distress, a par-
ticular component of broader mental health, have been associated with increases in smoking
(Grafova 2011; Ayyagari and Sindelar 2010; Siahpush and Carlin 2006; Barnes and Smith
2009; Cotti, Dunn, and Tefft 2014). Increases in perceived background risk could also reduce
longevity expectations, which in turn could reduce the costs of substance use in the short
term, thus increasing substance use.
Increases in background risk have been found to encourage greater risk aversion in a
variety of contexts (Heaton and Lucas 2000; Gollier and Pratt 1996; Cameron and Shah
2013), thus explaining how Katrina-induced perceived background risk increases could in-
crease the demand for health insurance. While demand for many forms of insurance (e.g.
home, health) may increase through this mechanism, the form of insurance I explore in this
paper is health insurance due to my focus on spillovers affecting behavioral health and the
availability of this outcome in my primary data. Additionally, demand for health insurance
in particular could also increase to improve access to healthcare services to either improve
mental health or reduce substance use, both of which may have increased through earlier
mentioned channels.
In total, I explore the influence of perceived background risk on four outcomes: poor men-
tal health, smoking, binge drinking, and health insurance. Perceived background risk could
affect these outcomes either directly or indirectly (through changes in longevity expectations
or property values, for example).
III Background on Hurricane Risks
Hurricanes/typhoons are rapidly-rotating storm systems formed over water with sus-
tained winds of at least 74 miles per hour. Storm surge poses the greatest risk from hurri-
canes and occurs when a column of water pushed inside and in front of the storm is released
over land, causing hydraulic impacts and debris collisions far inland. Storm surge from Ka-
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trina was as high as 25-28 feet and pushed up to 20 miles inland. The United States is
particularly vulnerable to storm surge, as much of the country’s densely populated Atlantic
and Gulf Coast coastlines are less than 10 feet above sea level (NOAA 2013). Further, res-
idents may be unaware and uninsured against the dangers of coastal storm surge flooding
because FEMA special flood hazard areas (SFHAs) are defined only for areas at-risk of fresh
water flooding.1 The percentage of homes in storm surge zones, but not in SFHAs, is greater
than 50% for 11 of 14 major coastal metro areas (Botts et al. 2012). A secondary danger
of hurricanes is wind damage, which can extend as far inland as Oklahoma, Arkansas, and
Tennessee (Kaplan and Demaria 1995) and can spawn tornadoes. Hurricane-induced torna-
does are heavily concentrated in the immediate coastal areas and typically occur within 12
hours before to 48 hours after the hurricane makes landfall (Schultz and Cecil 2009).
Due to warmer climates and geographical considerations, southern coastal states are more
prone to being hit by hurricanes than others. In the 10 years prior to Katrina, the states
with more than two hurricane landfalls are Florida (9), North Carolina (6), and Louisiana
(3). The states of Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia were each hit by one or
two hurricanes during this time period. Prior to Katrina, the northeast states of New York,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island had not seen a hurricane since Hurricane Bob
in 1991 (NOAA 2008).
IV Data
A Primary Data
The primary data are provided by the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS). State health departments and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) collect these cross-sectional data on risky personal health behaviors via landline tele-
1SFHAs are defined by FEMA as areas with a 1% or greater chance of fresh water flooding in a given
year. Since 1973, flood insurance has been required to purchase homes in the SFHA using a mortgage from
a federally regulated or insured lender.
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phone surveys of individuals aged 18 years and older. Cell-phone only households are not
included, which systematically excludes 8% of adults from participating in the survey in
2005 (Blumberg and Luke 2014). The data are nation- and state-representative of the non-
institutionalized population. The data identify 100% of respondents’ states and counties
of residence and date of interviews, as well as a variety of socio-demographic characteris-
tics including gender, race/ethnicity, age, education, employment/labor force participation,
marital status, and income. For the primary analysis, I use data from 2002 to 2007, with
Katrina occurring on August 25, 2005. This permits me to explore the immediate impact of
Katrina on outcomes.
Survey respondents are asked a standard question of recent emotional and mental distress:
“Now thinking about your mental health, which includes stress, depression, and problems
with emotions, for how many days during the past 30 days was your mental health not good?”
These data are heavily rightward skewed, with 67.5% of individuals reporting having 0 days
of stress and 5.1% reporting having 30 days of stress. The remaining 27.4% report integer
values between 1 and 29. I refer to this variable as “poor mental health” throughout.2
For smoking, survey respondents are asked if they have smoked 100 or more cigarettes in
their lifetime and, if so, if they have smoked over the past 30 days. If the individual answers
yes to both questions, then I classify them as a smoker.3 For binge drinking, individuals are
asked if they have consumed 5 or more drinks on any one occasion over the past 30 days,
but starting in 2006 this number was reduced to 4 or more drinks for women. For health
insurance, individuals are asked: “Do you have any kind of health care coverage, including
health insurance, prepaid plans such as HMOs, or government plans such as Medicare?”
2This question was the most widely available question on mental health across the 5 years of data used
in this analysis. It was a mandatory question for all years except 2002, when it was completed by only 23
states as part of an optional module. In 2004, a “Mental Illness and Stigma” section was completed by
11 states, and in 2006 an “Anxiety and Depression” section was completed by 36 states, but no optional
modules were used in 2005 with additional mental health questions.
3Intensive margin cigarette smoking is unfortunately not provided in the BRFSS data.
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B Secondary Data
Data from the Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) system are used
to determine counties at-risk of storm surge from a category 3 hurricane.4 I use these data to
proxy increases in perceived background risk following Katrina, which I argue is correlated
with actual risk. In addition to strength, this system takes into account land elevation,
unique bay and river configurations, water depths, rainfall, and physical features such as
bridges, roads, and levees. The SLOSH data were overlaid with county borders to determine
for each category of hurricane if any part of the county was in the SLOSH plane. Coastal
counties are always in the SLOSH plane, and in some areas the SLOSH plane extends deeper
inland.
A more complicated measure of risk from storm surge involves overlaying populations
and storm surge percentages within census tracks of counties to derive a county-level percent
population exposure to storm surge from a category 3 hurricane. In different analyses, I use
both this measure and the cruder “any exposure” measure to form the treatment.
I use the inland wind decay model developed by Kaplan and DeMaria to identify counties
outside of the storm surge region but potentially still vulnerable to wind damage, including
tornado damage, from hurricanes (Kaplan and DeMaria 1995). This model takes into account
increased penetration of dangerous wind speeds for stronger hurricanes, but it does not take
into account the changing topography or other possible local factors that may affect wind
speed. Similar to the SLOSH data, the wind data were overlaid with county borders to
determine if any part of the county could be affected by strong gale strength wind damage
of 47 miles per hour from a category 3 hurricane. This wind strength category was chosen
because this is the point at which winds begin to cause structural damage. The wind data
extend much further inland than in the SLOSH model and vary more greatly by hurricane
4Hurricane categories operate on a scale of 1-5, with five being the worst. Upon landfall, Katrina was
a strong category 3 hurricane. From 1851-2004, only three category five hurricanes have struck the United
States, (NOAA 2008) although many, including Katrina, have been category 5 hurricanes at some point at
sea.
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category strength. Since these “wind damage only” counties represent a level of risk from
hurricanes below storm surge but above no risk, I exclude these counties from the analysis
to more cleanly identify effects based on high risk or no risk.
To avoid confounding from the actual Katrina-induced disruption, three additional
sources of data are used. The first identifies counties that received any federal assistance
because of Katrina. These counties include all of Louisiana and Mississippi, west Alabama,
and west and south Florida.5 These counties are excluded from the analysis to avoid cap-
turing disruption from the actual hurricane rather than changes in perceived background
risk. A map showing counties at risk of storm surge and wind damage from a category 3
hurricane, as well as excluded counties receiving aid for Katrina, is presented in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1]
Two other hurricanes made landfall after Katrina in 2005—Hurricane Rita in Louisiana
and Texas on September 24, and Hurricane Wilma in Florida on October 24. Similar to
how I removed counties receiving any FEMA disaster aid assistance due to Katrina, I also
remove counties receiving any disaster aid assistance due to these other hurricanes.
The second source of data to reduce Katrina-induced disruption is ZIP code-level FEMA
application information for aid as of September 23, 2005, approximately one month after
Katrina, providing evacuee information for 1.3 million applicants with valid ZIP codes in the
continental United States. I was able to match 97% of these ZIP codes to a county.6
The third source of data to reduce Katrina-induced disruption is county-level distance
data to New Orleans, which may proxy uncontrolled economic factors in the aftermath of
Katrina.
Other merged data are used to control for time-varying policy and environmental controls.
Monthly state-level unemployment data are used to construct a state-level unemployment
5In route to striking New Orleans on August 29, 2005, Katrina struck the southern coast of Florida on
August 25, 2005.
6For cases in which an applicant’s ZIP codes overlapped two or more county borders, I partially assigned
the application to each county depending on number of residential ZIP codes in each county.
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rate to control for spillover effects of unemployment beyond individual-level employment
status. Income eligibility as a percent of the federal poverty line for low-income families
was collected from various Kaiser Family Foundation reports and is controlled for in all
regression analyses to control for possible Medicaid expansions occurring during this time
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016). Cigarette prices from the Tax Burden on Tobacco (Orze-
chowski and Walker 2009) are included in the smoking prevalence model. The American
Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA) Cost of Living Index beer prices
were aggregated to the state level and were used as a proxy for alcohol prices in the binge
drinking model. Smoke-free air law data for restaurants, bars, and private workplaces from
the ImpacTeen project were included in both the smoking prevalence and binge drinking
models. All monetary values were deflated to 2004 dollars using the consumer price index,
city average.
V Empirical Framework
In this paper, I examine if mental health, substance use, and health insurance increased
in non-damaged counties at-risk to storm surge from future hurricanes (compared to counties
not at-risk). I estimate the following model:
yisctm = α +Xi + λt + λc + ζsct + storm surgec ∗ λm (1)
Katrinat−6 + · · ·+Katrinat + · · ·+Katrinat+7 +
β1 storm surgec ∗ (Katrinat−6 + · · ·+Katrinat + · · ·+Katrinat+7) +
β2 evacuees per capitac ∗ (Katrinat + · · ·+Katrinat+7) +
β3 distance to New Orleansc ∗ (Katrinat + · · ·+Katrinat+7) + isctm
where yisctm is one of four outcomes. It is either equal to 1 if individual i living in county
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c of state s in month m of month-year t has health insurance, has smoked or binge drank
in the past 30 days, or is equal to the number of days of poor mental health over the past
30 days (outcomes analyzed separately). I estimate this equation using a linear probability
model so that results are easy-to-interpret marginal effects. I also use the population survey
weights provided by BRFSS. I cluster-correct all standard errors at the level of county.
I analyze the effect of Katrina on outcomes in the storm surge region (compared to the
control region impervious to hurricane damage) in 90 day intervals before and after Katrina
occurred. This allows me to empirically explore the parallel trends assumption, as well as
explore heterogeneity in effects across time after Katrina. I exclude the first 15 days after
Katrina because the mental health and substance use questions asked about behaviors over
the past 30 days; therefore, choosing the mid-point seemed appropriate so that respondents
were answering for a time interval in which Katrina had occurred for a majority of the time.
Therefore, the effect of Katrina in the post period is evaluated from days 15-104, 105-194,
etc. I show in a sensitivity analysis that results matter little whether the first 15 days are
included in the analysis or not.
I estimate these equations using individuals residing in either the non-damaged storm
surge region (after removing counties receiving federal disaster assistance for Hurricanes
Katrina, Wilma, or Rita) or the control region impervious to hurricanes (removing the
“wind damage only” region). This permits me to more cleanly identify effects of Katrina on
outcomes in places with risk to future hurricanes, compared to places without. For the health
insurance outcome, I discard individuals 65 years of age and above, since these individuals
will be eligible for Medicare and therefore I expect little variation in insurance coverage
within this population.
Xi is a set of controls at the individual level: gender, race/ethnicity, household income,
household income squared, top income category, age, age squared, education attainment,
marital status, and employment status. Employment status, in particular, may have changed
in the aftermath of Katrina; therefore, it is useful to control for this at the individual level.
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Additionally, for the binge drinking outcome, I include an indicator for women post-2006 to
control for the question wording change that reduced binge drinking for women from 5 to 4
drinks on any one occasion.
I also control for county fixed effects and year-by-month fixed effects. This removes
unobserved variation across the United States that is unique to a particular year-month, as
well as unobserved time-invariant variation unique to a particular county. Additionally, to
remove unobserved seasonal variation unique to storm surge counties and control counties,
I also include month fixed effects separately for the storm surge region and control region.
Fixed effects do not account for variation across both counties and time. I attempt to
control for this using a variety of policy and environmental characteristics that could be both
correlated with Katrina and the outcomes. This includes state-level unemployment rates,
Medicaid general income eligibility as a percent of the federal poverty level, cigarette prices
(smoking model), beer prices (binge drinking model), and smoke-free air laws (smoking and
binge drinking model). I also control for distance to New Orleans and evacuees per capita in
the post period, allowing heterogeneity within the post period across time to allow any effects
to dissipate as evacuees relocate home and any short-term economic shocks from Katrina
recede.
In addition to estimating equation 1 for the four outcomes, I also perform a secondary
analysis that replaces the indicator variable storm surgec with the county-level percent pop-
ulation exposure to storm surge from a category 3 hurricane. Since the treatment is more
finely allocated in this latter approach, I anticipate that estimated associations of Katrina
on outcomes should increase if risk is the mechanism driving the relationship.
VI Econometric Results
Summary statistics for individuals residing in the non-damaged storm surge region and
the control region are provided in Table 1. Individuals experienced an average of 3.4 days of
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poor mental health per 30 days. 20.3% smoked over the past 30 days and 15.7% binge drank
over the past 30 days. Among adults <65 years of age, 82.5% had health insurance. 24.4% of
the population resided in a county at-risk to storm surge from hurricanes, and within these
counties 41.1% of the population was vulnerable to such storm surge.
[Insert Table 1]
In Figure 2, I perform a balance check of key demographics (male, race/ethnicity, age, em-
ployment, and income) in the storm surge region in 90-day intervals before and after Katrina.
Demographics may change noticeably in the post-Katrina period, perhaps because evacuees
were disproportionately settling into the storm surge region versus the control region, or
because of uncontrolled aspects of economic distress. While I control for observable demo-
graphics and state-level unemployment rates in the analysis, large changes in demographics
could suggest changing unobservable characteristics that I cannot control for directly and
which may introduce bias into the analysis. Fortunately, I see limited evidence that ob-
servables changed more significantly across Katrina than random noise (from changes at
other periods of time). I also produced the same result for the control region in Figure 3
and again did not find significant differences across Katrina. The noise in Figure 3 for the
control region was substantially reduced compared to in Figure 2 for the storm surge region
by having 4 times as many observations. In sum, I see limited evidence that unobserved
differences could introduce significant bias to the analysis. To proxy control any remaining
unobservable differences in selective migration or economic distress, I control for distance to
New Orleans and evacuees per capita in the post-Katrina period.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3]
Table 2 shows partial results from equation 1, exploring the effect of Katrina in 90-day
intervals before and after Katrina in the storm surge region relative to the control region,
compared to the reference group of the difference between these two regions 540 days (roughly
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1.5 years) before Katrina. I first evaluate if parallel trends are present in the pre-period.
Non-parallel trends could indicate the presence of a time-varying variable that differentially
influences the control and treatment group, which is a threat to causal interpretation. While
one coefficient in both the binge drinking model and health insurance model is statistically
significant roughly 1 year before Katrina, the Wald test of joint significance of the 6 pre-
Katrina time intervals suggests that I cannot reject the Null hypothesis that the trends are
parallel for all four outcomes.
[Insert Table 2]
I turn to evaluating the effect after Katrina. In day 15-104 after Katrina, I observe that
poor mental health days increased by 0.30 days per 30 days (8.8% of the mean, p<0.10) in
the non-damaged storm surge region relative to the control region. Additionally, smoking
increased by 2.4 percentage points (12.2% of the mean, p<0.01). While poor mental health
appears to have declined to baseline by the second post-Katrina time period (105-194 days
after Katrina), the increase in smoking persists. In the second post-Katrina time period,
smoking was 2.0 percentage points higher in the storm surge region relative to the control
region (p<0.01) and remained 1.7 percentage points higher (p<0.10) in the third post-
Katrina time period. Taken together, these results suggest a role for addiction in prolonging
smoking beyond the point at which poor mental health returned to normal levels.
We do not find evidence of an immediate increase in binge drinking or obtaining health
insurance. Binge drinking may have even decreased in the third and fourth 90-day periods
after Katrina (p<0.10) compared to 1.5 years before Katrina. Health insurance coverage
did increase in the third 90-day period after Katrina by 2.4 percentage points (2.8% of the
mean, p<0.05).
In Online Table 1, I show that the results are largely insensitive to including the first 15
days after Katrina as part of the first post period, rather than excluding these observations.
Results were slightly attenuated in the first post-Katrina period, which is likely due to the
questions asking about mental health and substance use over a 30-day period. This means
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that respondents shortly after Katrina were answering about behaviors primarily in the
pre-Katrina period, hence attenuating results towards the null of no effect.
In Table 3, I re-evaluate the results using county-level population exposure, rather than an
indicator variable for the presence of any county-level exposure, as the treatment variable.
A strength of this approach is that it allows me to observe if effect sizes increase since
the treatment of actual risk from hurricanes is more precisely allocated. This alternative
definition of the treatment does require re-testing the parallel trends assumption.
[Insert Table 3]
Under this alternative definition of the treatment group, the parallel trends assumption
holds for all outcomes except smoking. This suggests caution in interpreting results from
the smoking model when using population exposure as the treatment versus any exposure.
I do find evidence of larger effect sizes when the treatment is more precisely defined. In the
first 90-day period after Katrina, poor mental health days increased by 0.7 days per 30 days
(20.2%, p<0.01). Smoking increased by 4.9 percentage points (24.9%, p<0.01), but this
result is biased upward by pre-Katrina trends. Health insurance increases by 4.6 percentage
points (5.4% of the mean, p<0.01) in the third 90-day period after Katrina. Binge drinking
is now estimated to increase by 2.0 percentage points (16.4% of the mean) in the first 90-day
period after Katrina, but this result was not statistically significant.
For both treatment definitions, I examined the coefficients on evacuees per capita and
distance from New Orleans. In the first 90 day-period after Katrina, only distance was a
statistically significant predictor of poor mental health (mental health declined closer to
New Orleans). This may capture economic distress not controlled by other variables, or
another explanation such as individuals living closer to New Orleans were more likely to
have connections with people harmed by the hurricane. I remove any remaining confounding
variation by controlling for these variables in the analysis. The relative lack of significant
findings of these variables suggest that my strategy of excluding directly impacted counties
was largely successful in removing confounding from migration and economic factors.
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VII Discussion
This study uses an unprecedented large-scale disaster, Katrina, as a natural experiment
to study how increases in perceived background risk affect mental health, substance use, and
health insurance. Media attention may have contributed to individuals that live in counties
vulnerable to hurricanes to focus on being harmed by a future hurricane rather than on the
small probability of this occurring (Sunstein 2003). Economists have also found evidence for
the substantial overweighting of small probabilities in deductible choices for home and auto
insurance (Barseghyan et al. 2013).
Within non-damaged counties at risk of any storm surge, I find causal evidence that
Katrina increased poor mental health days by 8.8% for about three months after Katrina,
and smoking increased by about 10% over nine months. Approximately 44.4 million adults
lived in the non-damaged storm surge counties in 2005, so estimates suggest that in the first
3 months after Katrina, 1.1 million extra individuals smoked and individuals experienced
a total of 39.0 million extra days of poor mental health. To provide an illustration of the
magnitude of the effect that Katrina had on smoking, a cigarette price increase of 30%
would have been needed to offset this increase in smoking (using a consensus cigarette price
elasticity of -0.4, IARC 2011). When adjusting for population exposure within these non-
damaged storm surge counties, I find causal evidence that Katrina increased poor mental
health days by 20.3% in the first three months. I also observe a 16.4% increase in binge
drinking in the first three months, but this was not statistically significant.
These results suggest that the government failures in managing Katrina may have had
a potentially large effect on mental health and substance use for people living far from the
actual disaster. This highlights an important, if under-appreciated, role of the government
and disaster-management agencies: preventing increases in perceived background risk that
can deteriorate mental health and increase substance use.
The results of this study suggest that cigarette smoking returned to baseline 9 months
after Katrina. Even short-term use of cigarettes can have substantial health consequences
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and negative externalities according to a report issued by Doe and colleagues (2009). Smok-
ing immediately increases blood pressure, heart rate, and constricts blood vessels, leading
to increased risk for sudden strokes and myocardial infarction. Additionally, smoking im-
mediately increases susceptibility to pneumonia. Smoking and second-hand smoke interferes
with drug breakdown processes for certain blood-thinners, antidepressants, and anti-seizure
medications, causing prescription drugs to not work as effectively and for drugs to poten-
tially stay in the body at dangerous concentrations for longer. Finally, infants and children
are especially susceptible to secondhand smoke exposure, so temporary smoking may have
affected outcomes of birth weight, sudden infant death syndrome, and infant middle ear and
respiratory infections (Doe et al. 2009).
I also find evidence that health insurance coverage increased in the third 90-day period
after Katrina, by 5.4% in the results adjusting for population exposure to storm surge from
hurricanes. These increases do not persist into other periods, however. On explanation
could be that deteriorated mental health or increases in substance use raised temporary
demand for health insurance to obtain access to health services to improve mental health
or reduce substance use. The increase in health insurance coverage roughly coincides with
mental health and substance use returning to baseline levels, adding support to this theory.
However, the more likely explanation, perhaps, is that the increase in health insurance is
not meaningfully associated with perceived background risk changes from Katrina.
As mentioned in the conceptual model, I cannot determine if increases in perceived back-
ground risk influenced these outcomes directly, or indirectly through changes in property
values/insurance premiums, longevity expectations, or through changes in the other out-
comes. The temporary increase in these measures, however, may lend credibility to the
notion that perceived background risks influenced these outcomes directly, as opposed to
first influencing property values prices, for example. One previous study found that it took
five years before property values recovered following a “near-miss” disaster (Bin and Landry
2013), and my outcomes return to baseline over a 9 month period of time. However, my
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study is incapable of answering this question definitively, and this would be an excellent
subject for future research.
Research suggests that the most effective government response to the public’s miscalcu-
lating of small probabilities may be information and education (Becker and Rubinstein 2011;
Sunstein 2003). An example of a benefit of information and education is that following a
Mississippi River flood, home prices fell only in flooded areas outside the SFHA, but prices
did not fall in the SFHA. This may have been because individuals in the SFHA were more
likely to know of flooding risks ex-ante because of notification and insurance requirements,
and so home prices already reflected accurate background risk (Kousky 2010). Similarly,
poor mental health and substance use may not have responded to Katrina as dramatically
if individuals were better informed of accurate risks in advance. Mandating notification for
home owners and renters living in the storm surge plane similar to the notification individ-
uals receive when living in SFHAs may help prevent sudden mental health, substance use,
and health insurance responses to unusually destructive hurricanes.
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FIGURE 1. HURRICANE RISK REGIONS AND DIRECTLY IMPACTED COUNTIES
Notes: The storm surge counties are identified using the Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes
(SLOSH) system maintained by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The wind damage
only counties are identified as counties outside of the storm surge region that are vulnerable to strong gale
strength wind speeds of 47 MPH from hurricanes (Kaplan and DeMaria 1995).
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FIGURE 2. BALANCE CHECK OF KEY DEMOGRAPHICS IN NON-DAMAGED
STORM SURGE REGION
Notes: The x-axis represents 90 day intervals to Hurricane Katrina, with 0 being days 0-59 before
Hurricane Katrina, and 1 being days 15-74 after Hurricane Katrina.
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FIGURE 3. BALANCE CHECK OF KEY DEMOGRAPHICS IN CONTROL REGION
Notes: The x-axis represents 90 day intervals to Hurricane Katrina, with 0 being days 0-59 before
Hurricane Katrina, and 1 being days 15-74 after Hurricane Katrina.
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TABLE 1—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SAMPLE USED IN ANALYSIS, 2002-2007
N Mean Standard Deviation
BRFSS
Male (%) 1,299,101 0.486 -
Female (%) 1,299,101 0.514 -
White non-Hispanic (%) 1,299,101 0.701 -
Black non-Hispanic (%) 1,299,101 0.083 -
Asian non-Hispanic (%) 1,299,101 0.036 -
Native American non-Hispanic (%) 1,299,101 0.011 -
Hispanic (%) 1,299,101 0.138 -
Missing Race/Ethnicity (%) 1,299,101 0.031 -
Age 1,299,101 45.551 17.547
Junior High (%) 1,299,101 0.045 -
Some High School (%) 1,299,101 0.071 -
High School (%) 1,299,101 0.289 -
Some College (%) 1,299,101 0.269 -
College (%) 1,299,101 0.322 -
Missing Education (%) 1,299,101 0.004 -
Employed (%) 1,299,101 0.616 -
Unemployed (%) 1,299,101 0.053 -
Student (%) 1,299,101 0.046 -
Not Student, Not in Labor Force (%) 1,299,101 0.281 -
Missing Employed Status (%) 1,299,101 0.005 -
Married (%) 1,299,101 0.589 -
Divorced (%) 1,299,101 0.112 -
Widowed (%) 1,299,101 0.064 -
Unmarried and Other Marital Status (%) 1,299,101 0.232 -
Missing Marital Status (%) 1,299,101 0.003 -
Real Household Income (without imputation) 1,125,696 47,563 27,075
Real Household Income (with imputation) 1,299,101 46,552 26,211
Top Household Income Category (%) 1,299,101 0.233 -
Days Mental Health Not Good over Past 30 Days 1,191,228 3.399 7.419
Current Smoker (%) (Past 30 Days) 1,294,512 0.203 -
Binge Drinker (%) (Past 30 Days) 1,276,796 0.157 -
Health Insurance (<65 Years of Age) (%) 980,030 0.825 -
Merged Outside Data
State-Level Unemployment Rate (%) 1,299,101 5.338 1.069
Real Price of Pack of Cigarettes (in dollars) 1,299,101 3.95 0.66
Real Price of 6-Pack of Heineken Beer (in dollars) 1,299,101 7.34 0.36
State-Level Smoke-Free Air Law Index (scale of 1-9) 1,299,101 3.620 3.381
General Medicaid Income Eligibility (% of Federal Poverty Level) 1,299,101 188.156 28.159
Reside in Category 3 Hurricane Storm Surge County (%) 1,299,101 0.244 -
Population Exposure w/in Storm Surge Counties (%) 342,524 0.411 0.264
County-Level Hurricane Katrina Evacuees Per 1,000 1,299,101 0.526 0.781
Distance to New Orleans 1,299,101 1,128 467
Notes: All prices are in 2004 dollars. Missing observations for poor mental health are mostly due to this
outcome being collected by only 23 states in 2002.
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TABLE 2—EVENT STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF HURRICANE KATRINA IN STORM
SURGE COUNTIES, 2002-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poor Mental Health Binge Drinking Smoking Health Insurance
Pre-Hurricane Katrina
450-539 Days Before HK * 0.200 -0.005 0.004 0.004
Storm Surge Region [0.149] [0.007] [0.010] [0.008]
360-449 Days Before HK * 0.223 -0.016* 0.011 -0.011
Storm Surge Region [0.194] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011]
270-359 Days Before HK * 0.100 0.001 0.005 -0.023**
Storm Surge Region [0.166] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011]
180-269 Days Before HK * -0.156 -0.011 0.000 -0.007
Storm Surge Region [0.195] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010]
90-179 Days Before HK * 0.057 -0.009 0.002 0.009
Storm Surge Region [0.193] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
0-89 Days Before HK * -0.086 -0.012* 0.008 -0.011
Storm Surge Region [0.213] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
P-value of Joint Significance 0.486 0.363 0.861 0.198
Post-Hurricane Katrina
15-104 Days After HK * 0.293* 0.002 0.024*** -0.008
Storm Surge Region [0.167] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010]
105-194 Days After HK * -0.067 -0.003 0.020*** 0.011
Storm Surge Region [0.163] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009]
195-284 Days After HK * 0.061 -0.017* 0.017* 0.024**
Storm Surge Region [0.188] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
285-374 Days After HK * -0.191 -0.016* -0.012 -0.002
Storm Surge Region [0.184] [0.009] [0.008] [0.012]
375-464 Days After HK * 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.005
Storm Surge Region [0.146] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
465-554 Days After HK * 0.082 -0.003 0.013 0.004
Storm Surge Region [0.192] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011]
555+ Days After HK * 0.063 -0.010* 0.002 0.003
Storm Surge Region [0.087] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Individual Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State / County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-by-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Risk Region-by-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,191,228 1,276,796 1,294,512 980,030
Dependent Variable Mean 3.345 0.122 0.197 0.849
Notes: Each column presents results from one regression model. Coefficients are in reference to the difference between the
storm surge region and control region 1.5 years (540 days or more) before Hurricane Katrina. State / County Controls include
distance to New Orleans in the post-Katrina period, evacuees per capita in the post-Katrina period, unemployment rate,
Medicaid insurance eligibility, beer prices (binge drinking), cigarette prices (smoking model), and smoke-free air laws (binge
drinking and smoking models). *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the
10 percent level.
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TABLE 3—EVENT STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF HURRICANE KATRINA IN STORM
SURGE COUNTIES BY POPULATION EXPOSURE, 2002-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poor Mental Health Binge Drinking Smoking Health Insurance
Pre-Hurricane Katrina
450-539 Days Before HK * 0.249 -0.005 0.001 -0.004
Population Exposure [0.263] [0.013] [0.016] [0.015]
360-449 Days Before HK * 0.347 -0.018 0.039** -0.031
Population Exposure [0.299] [0.014] [0.017] [0.021]
270-359 Days Before HK * 0.291 0.007 0.024 -0.011
Population Exposure [0.277] [0.015] [0.016] [0.017]
180-269 Days Before HK * -0.006 -0.013 -0.007 -0.023
Population Exposure [0.363] [0.013] [0.015] [0.018]
90-179 Days Before HK * 0.045 -0.006 -0.006 0.003
Population Exposure [0.345] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013]
0-89 Days Before HK * 0.071 -0.003 0.023* -0.012
Population Exposure [0.399] [0.012] [0.013] [0.017]
P-value of Joint Significance 0.818 0.801 0.081 0.647
Post-Hurricane Katrina
15-104 Days After HK * 0.675** 0.020 0.049*** -0.004
Population Exposure [0.262] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018]
105-194 Days After HK * -0.009 0.003 0.026** 0.016
Population Exposure [0.270] [0.013] [0.013] [0.015]
195-284 Days After HK * 0.231 -0.016 0.022 0.046***
Population Exposure [0.319] [0.014] [0.017] [0.018]
285-374 Days After HK * -0.150 -0.017 0.007 -0.006
Population Exposure [0.292] [0.015] [0.014] [0.021]
375-464 Days After HK * 0.250 0.018 -0.003 0.017
Population Exposure [0.272] [0.015] [0.016] [0.014]
465-554 Days After HK * 0.335 -0.004 0.024 0.010
Population Exposure [0.379] [0.015] [0.015] [0.017]
555+ Days After HK * 0.245 -0.003 0.013 0.003
Population Exposure [0.150] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
Individual Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State / County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-by-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Risk Region-by-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,191,228 1,276,796 1,294,512 980,030
Dependent Variable Mean 3.345 0.122 0.197 0.849
Notes: Each column presents results from one regression model. Coefficients are in reference to the difference between the
storm surge region and control region 1.5 years (540 days or more) before Hurricane Katrina. State / County Controls include
distance to New Orleans in the post-Katrina period, evacuees per capita in the post-Katrina period, unemployment rate,
Medicaid insurance eligibility, beer prices (binge drinking), cigarette prices (smoking model), and smoke-free air laws (binge
drinking and smoking models). *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the
10 percent level.
27
ONLINE TABLE 1—EVENT STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF HURRICANE KATRINA IN
STORM SURGE COUNTIES, KEEPING 15 DAYS AFTER KATRINA, 2002-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poor Mental Health Binge Drinking Smoking Health Insurance
Pre-Hurricane Katrina
450-539 Days Before HK * 0.198 -0.005 0.004 0.004
Storm Surge Region [0.149] [0.007] [0.010] [0.008]
360-449 Days Before HK * 0.227 -0.015 0.012 -0.010
Storm Surge Region [0.194] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011]
270-359 Days Before HK * 0.093 0.000 0.004 -0.023**
Storm Surge Region [0.165] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011]
180-269 Days Before HK * -0.156 -0.011 0.000 -0.007
Storm Surge Region [0.196] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010]
90-179 Days Before HK * 0.055 -0.009 0.002 0.009
Storm Surge Region [0.193] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
0-89 Days Before HK * -0.080 -0.012 0.009 -0.011
Storm Surge Region [0.213] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
P-value of Joint Significance 0.498 0.403 0.831 0.195
Post-Hurricane Katrina
0-104 Days After HK * 0.292* 0.000 0.020*** -0.006
Storm Surge Region [0.160] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009]
105-194 Days After HK * -0.067 -0.003 0.019*** 0.011
Storm Surge Region [0.164] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009]
195-284 Days After HK * 0.060 -0.017* 0.017* 0.024**
Storm Surge Region [0.188] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
285-374 Days After HK * -0.186 -0.015 -0.011 -0.002
Storm Surge Region [0.185] [0.009] [0.008] [0.012]
375-464 Days After HK * 0.095 0.000 -0.001 0.005
Storm Surge Region [0.146] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
465-554 Days After HK * 0.080 -0.003 0.013 0.004
Storm Surge Region [0.192] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011]
555+ Days After HK * 0.062 -0.010* 0.002 0.003
Storm Surge Region [0.086] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Individual Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State / County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-by-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Risk Region-by-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,200,183 1,285,765 1,303,596 986,495
Dependent Variable Mean 3.346 0.122 0.197 0.849
Notes: Each column presents results from one regression model. Coefficients are in reference to the difference between the
storm surge region and control region 1.5 years (540 days or more) before Hurricane Katrina. State / County Controls include
distance to New Orleans in the post-Katrina period, evacuees per capita in the post-Katrina period, unemployment rate,
Medicaid insurance eligibility, beer prices (binge drinking), cigarette prices (smoking model), and smoke-free air laws (binge
drinking and smoking models). *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the
10 percent level.
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